



# UNSC

Russian/Ukrainian Crisis



ATAYURT  
MODEL UN CLUB

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## **Welcoming Letter of the Secretary Generals,**

Most Honourable Participants,

As this year's Secretaries-General, we are more than honoured to welcome you to our conference. As the pandemic wore down we were able to establish the social connections which were desired for years with our last conference, ATAMUN21. We wholeheartedly believe that our last conference was the spark that was needed to revive the social events and other model united nations programs. We proudly take the honour of our last conference. With that honour bestowed, we are delighted to declare ATAMUN22, which again will be a momentous milestone. Now is the chance to reconnect with the individuals missed fondly and experience the awe once again.

Since its establishment, ATAMUN has been the voice of the youth, assembled and directed by the youth. It is such an awe-inspiring institution that withstood the crises provoked by various challenges and was competent to thrive in its darkest hours. It brought people with diverse cultures, identities, and most prominently ideas. This time it shall excel even further with its outstanding team driven by enthusiasm and ambition. Experiences from our past have enlightened us about organizing such an event and with that knowledge, passion, and ambition we ensure that it shall be a delightful and compelling experience.

To achieve such an experience, we have been working vigorously on our topics and committees which could be seen on our website. We believe that these agenda items which will be debated will be considerably propitious to your thinking and understanding of the globe. With our incredible academic team, we shall be entertaining 1 joint crisis committee, 1 junior committee, and 4 various committees to enrich the vision of the youth. These committees shall follow the rules of the Harvard procedure and the joint crisis committee will possess special rules of procedure.

Lastly, as Secretaries-General we would be more than pleased to see you in June on ATAMUN22.

Kind Regards,  
Taha Kağan Güneş  
Ekin Özdöngül

### **Letter From Chairboard**

Hello Delegates;

Welcome to ATAMUN'22! My name is Tunahan ERGÜRHAN and I am proud to be chairing the UNSC committee. I'm currently in 10th grade at Atayurt Science High School and attending MUNs for several years.

My MUN journey began in high school and this will be my 8th time serving as a chair at a MUN conference. I enjoy MUN a lot because it is a wonderful opportunity to learn more about global affairs, and practice my critical thinking and public speaking skills in a professional manner. It is also fun to meet people who share the same interests and I am excited to meet all of you this June

As your chair, I will be moderating the committee sessions and I look forward to seeing what all of you will come up with throughout the weekend. Since ATAMUN'22s USNC is a timely committee, I hope it will be a memorable learning experience for all and I'm more than happy to answer your questions before, during and after the conference. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me and I'd be happy to help you out. Looking forward to an awesome ATAMUN'22 with all of you!

Best,

Tunahan

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## **Preface**

Russia and Ukraine have been embroiled in conflict for the past eight years – in 2014, Russia took advantage of political turmoil in the neighbouring country to seize and establish military control over Ukraine's southern Crimean peninsula.

An ensuing war – between Ukraine's military and Russian-backed rebels and Russian troops in Ukraine's two eastern regions collectively known as the Donbas – never formally ended, and to date, an estimated 14,000 people have been killed and an estimated 1.5 million displaced. A full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is currently underway, following a huge build-up of troops along the Ukrainian border.

Russia's president Putin denied planning an invasion during that troop build-up. Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, compared the situation to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a tense 13-day standoff between the US and the Soviet Union over the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, which historian Mark White described as the most dangerous confrontation in human history.

In January, Russian officials issued an ultimatum to the west demanding written guarantees against Nato's further eastern expansion. President Putin wants Ukraine and other former Soviet states to be banned from ever becoming members of the organisation.

With Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, Putin has started what could be the most significant conflict in Europe since the Second World War, says the EU. Here, to put today's Russia-Ukraine crisis into context, historian Serhiy Yekelchuk charts nine milestone moments in the history of the relationship between the two countries.

## **Background**

### **The Ems Act**

In 1764, Catherine II (1729–96) abolished the Hetmanate to erase the last remnants of Ukrainian autonomy, and the Russian army destroyed the Cossack stronghold on the Dnieper. Cossack officers could make claims to noble status – the empire agreed to accept them as equal to Russian nobles as long as they could provide the relevant paperwork – but Ukrainian peasants eventually became enserfed.

During the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century, Catherine acquired a large stretch of Ukrainian lands that Poland had retained after 1654. As the institutional legacy of the Hetmanate was being dismantled, new interest in Ukrainian history and folklore developed among intellectuals under the influence of pan-European Romanticism. During the 1840s, Ukraine's national bard, Taras Shevchenko (1814–61), published his first poems in Ukrainian and subsequently co-founded a secret political society that discussed a free Slavic federation and the abolition of serfdom.

### **Ukrainian independence**

With the collapse of the Russian monarchy in 1917 under the strain of war and political discord, patriotic Ukrainians established their coordinating body, the Central Rada (Council), which soon developed into a revolutionary parliament. The Russian Provisional Government granted Ukraine autonomy under the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), but the Bolsheviks subsequently refused to recognise it and invaded Ukraine in order to include it in the Soviet state. The UNR declared full independence in January 1918 and signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers in Brest before the Bolsheviks did the same.

The German authorities installed a Ukrainian monarch under the historic title of the hetman, but the UNR returned to power after the end of the First World War and proclaimed unification with the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The UNR could not survive the titanic clash between the Russian Reds and Whites during the Russian civil war (1917–22), as neither power recognised Ukrainian sovereignty, but the precedent of Ukrainian independence forced the Bolsheviks to create the Soviet Ukrainian Republic which in 1922 became a founding member of the Soviet Union.

However, in the early 1930s, Stalin returned to the unfinished task of crushing the

Ukrainian political nation, which developed during the Revolution. Some 4 million Ukrainian peasants perished in the state-engineered famine of 1932–33, which in Ukraine is known as the Holodomor (“murder through starvation”) and considered a genocide – an interpretation increasingly accepted worldwide, but which Russia rejects. Stalin also destroyed the Ukrainian cultural elite and began promoting the tsarist notion of Ukrainians as the Russians’ “younger brother.”

### **The enlarged Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic**

Following up on his agreement with Hitler on the division of East-Central Europe between them, Stalin invaded Poland in September 1939 and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR the Ukrainian lands that Poland had kept after its brief war with the Bolsheviks in 1919, a stalemate which ended Lenin’s dream of the Red cavalry bringing the revolution to Europe. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt allowed Stalin to keep these territories.

The Soviets also pressured Czechoslovakia into giving up its “Rusyn” lands. The resulting enlarged Ukrainian SSR came to incorporate nearly all the territories with an ethnic Ukrainian majority under its energetic party boss Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971).

Khrushchev thereby achieved a longstanding aim of Ukrainian patriots to create a united Ukraine, but pursued a course of cultural assimilation into Russia rather than promoting Ukrainian autonomy. Stubborn armed resistance to Soviet rule by Ukrainian nationalists in the formerly Polish territories continued into the 1950s.

### **The transfer of the Crimean Peninsula**

Although attached by land only to Ukraine, Crimea (Ukraine’s southern Crimean peninsula) became an autonomous republic within Russia in 1921, partly because of the peninsula’s strategic significance. Neither Russians nor Ukrainians constituted a majority there, and in the 1920s the Soviets cultivated the culture of the Crimean Tatars, who had lived on the peninsula since the 13th century and whose Crimean Khanate the Russian Empire conquered in 1783, to impress the Western colonies and newly independent states in Asia with their seemingly benevolent policies. When the Red Army retook Crimea from Nazi Germany in 1944, however, Stalin ordered a forced deportation of the Tatars, which many historians consider genocidal. As a result of this deportation, ethnic Russians became a numerical majority virtually overnight. The war had left the peninsula’s economy and cities in ruins. To mark the 300 years since Pereiaslav, Khrushchev organised the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR, which was to rebuild it and supply it with fresh water through a major channel to be constructed. He also hoped to gratify the Ukrainian bureaucrats comprising his power

base and, perhaps, to add a culturally Russian counterweight to the recently incorporated nationalistic western regions.

## **The collapse of the Soviet Union**

When Mikhail Gorbachev's (1931–) loosening of ideological controls resulted in the mass rejection of Soviet communism, Ukrainian and Russian democratic activists worked together to usher in the new politics, such as freedom of speech and free elections. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's (1931–2007) administration did not try to preserve the Soviet federation but, rather, sought an independent Russia. This made Yeltsin a natural ally of President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (1934–), but only as long as both rejected the Soviet legacy. The Ukrainian referendum in December 1991 spelt the end of the union, and Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus initiated its formal dissolution. However, with economic reforms stalling in the early 1990s, Yeltsin and other Russian figures increasingly appealed to domestic nationalists nostalgic for the Soviet empire by criticising Ukrainian cultural policies and questioning the transfer of Crimea. In 1997, a comprehensive treaty between Russia and Ukraine affirmed the integrity of the Ukrainian borders – something that Russia and the Western nuclear powers also guaranteed in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, when Ukraine agreed to surrender its Soviet-made nuclear arsenal. This treaty expired on 31 March 2019.

## **Post-Soviet context and Orange Revolution**

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were removed from Russia and dismantled. In return, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) agreed to uphold the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.

In the years after the dissolution of the USSR, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional security threats involving Russia such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders described this expansion as a violation of Western powers' informal assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin; he later implicated Russian involvement. In November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich

was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote-rigging by election observers. During a two-month period which became known as the Orange Revolution, largely peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome.

After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to widespread electoral fraud, a second-round re-run was held, bringing to power Yushchenko as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving Yanukovich in opposition. The Orange Revolution is often grouped together with other early-21st century protest movements, particularly within the former USSR, known as colour revolutions. According to Anthony Cordesman, Russian military officers viewed such colour revolutions as an attempt by the US and European states to destabilise neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national security. Russian President Vladimir Putin accused organisers of the 2011–2013 Russian protests of being former advisors to Yushchenko and described the protests as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia. Rallies in favour of Putin during this period were called "anti-Orange protests". At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among NATO members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) in order to avoid antagonising Russia, while US President George W. Bush pushed for their admission. NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO". Putin voiced strong opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids.

### **The Russian annexation of Crimea**

On 20 February 2014, Russia began its annexation of Crimea. On 22 and 23 February, Russian troops and special forces began moving into Crimea through Novorossiysk. On 27 February, Russian forces without insignias began their advance into the Crimean Peninsula. They took hold of strategic positions and captured the Crimean Parliament, raising a Russian flag.

Security checkpoints were used to cut the Crimean Peninsula off from the rest of Ukraine and to restrict movement within the territory. In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a communications centre. Russian cyberattacks shut down websites associated with the Ukrainian government, news media, and social media.

Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access to the mobile phones of Ukrainian officials and members of parliament over the next few days—some of whom had their phones disabled as a result—further severing lines of communication. On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed forces, leading to an influx of Russian troops and military hardware into the peninsula.[80] In the following days, all remaining Ukrainian military bases and installations were surrounded and besieged, including the Southern Naval Base. After Russia formally annexed the peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian

military bases and ships were stormed by Russian forces. On 24 March, Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by 30 March, all Ukrainian forces had left the peninsula. On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily occupied by Russia. After the annexation, the Russian government increased its military presence in the region and leveraged nuclear threats to solidify the new status quo on the ground. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that a Russian military task force would be established in Crimea. In November, NATO stated that it believed Russia was deploying nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea. By January 2022, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained remote.

When a popular revolution in Ukraine removed the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich and brought to power pro-Western democratic forces – an act approved by the parliament and confirmed by snap presidential elections – the Russian authorities took advantage of the turmoil to establish military control over Crimea.

They calculated that the local Russian majority would support the peninsula's incorporation into Russia, attracted by higher salaries and better career options without the need to study Ukrainian. But the sham referendum on joining Russia produced implausible results, and the world community, aside from a few pro-Russian outliers like North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela, decisively condemned the annexation. Facing punitive western sanctions, Russian authorities in Crimea began to repress local Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists.

Having ensured its control over Crimea, Russia also fomented rebellions in other southeastern Ukrainian provinces, where the dominant regional parties have long cultivated pro-Russian attitudes. But this strategy only worked in the Donbas, a depressed industrial region with a Russian-speaking majority. When Ukrainian troops tried to re-establish control, President Putin's administration covertly sent regular army units to support the pro-Russian separatists and Russian "volunteers." The active phase of the war lasted until the fall of 2015, with the renewed escalation in 2017 and early 2020, resulting in an estimated human cost of 14,000 killed and an estimated 1.5 million displaced.

### **Russian bases in Crimea**

At the onset of its conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea Fleet, in several locations in the Crimean peninsula like Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske, Simferopol Raion, Sarych, and several others. The disposition of the Russian armed forces in Crimea was not disclosed clearly to the public, which led to several incidents like the 2005 conflict near the Sarych cape lighthouse. Russian presence was allowed by the basing and transit agreement with Ukraine.

Under the agreements, the Russian military in Crimea was constrained to a maximum of 25,000 troops, required to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honour its legislation

and not interfere in the internal affairs of the country, and show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international border.

Operations beyond designated deployment sites were permitted only after coordination with the competent agencies of Ukraine. Early in the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia to significantly reinforce its military presence under the plausible guise of security concerns, deploy special forces and other required capabilities to conduct the operation in Crimea. According to the original treaty on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in 1997, Russia was allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which it would evacuate all military units including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.

A Russian construction project to re-home to fleet in Novorossiysk was launched in 2005 and was expected to be fully completed by 2020; as of 2010, the project faced major budget cuts and construction delays. On 21 April 2010, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich signed a new deal known as the Kharkiv Pact, to resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it extended the stay until 2042 with an option to renew, and in return obtained some discounts on gas delivered from Russia.

The Kharkiv Pact was rather an update to a complex of several fundamental treaties signed in the 1990s between the prime ministers of both countries Viktor Chernomyrdin (Russia) and Pavlo Lazarenko (Ukraine), and presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine). The Constitution of Ukraine, whilst generally prohibiting the deployment of foreign bases on the country's soil, originally also had a transitional provision, which allowed the use of existing military bases on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing of foreign military formations; this permitted Russian military to keep its base in Crimea as an "existing military base". The constitutional provision on "pre-existing bases" was revoked in 2019 after Russia had already annexed Crimea and withdrawn from the basing treaties unilaterally.

## **The war in Donbas**

The first protests across southern and eastern Ukraine were largely native expressions of discontent with the new Ukrainian government. Russian involvement at this stage was limited to voicing support for the demonstrations, and the emergence of the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk began as a small fringe group of protesters, independent of Russian control. Russia went on to take advantage of this, however, and launched a co-ordinated political and military campaign against Ukraine, as part of the broader Russo-Ukrainian War. Putin gave legitimacy to the nascent separatist movement when he described the Donbas as part of the historic "New Russia" (Novorossiia) region and issued a statement of bewilderment as to how the region had ever become part of Ukraine in 1922 with the foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

When the Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist leaders in early March, they were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services and interests in Russian businesses, probably by order of Russian intelligence. By April 2014, Russian citizens had taken control of the separatist movement, and were supported by volunteers and materiel from Russia, including Chechen and Cossack fighters. According to DPR commander Igor Girkin, without this support in April, the movement would have fizzled out, as it had in Kharkiv and Odesa. The disputed referendum on the status of Donetsk Oblast was held on 11 May.

These demonstrations, which followed the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and which were part of a wider group of concurrent pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine, escalated into an armed conflict between the Russia-backed separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively), and the Ukrainian government. The SBU claimed key commanders of the rebel movement during the beginning of the conflict, including Igor Strelkov and Igor Bezler were Russian agents.

The prime minister of Donetsk People's Republic from May to August 2014 was a Russian citizen, Alexander Borodai. From August 2014 on, all top positions in Donetsk and Luhansk were held by Ukrainian citizens. Russian volunteers are reported to make up from 15% to 80% of the combatants, with many said to be former military personnel. Recruitment for the Donbas insurgents was performed openly in Russian cities using private or voyenkomat facilities, as was confirmed by a number of Russian media.

Economic and material circumstances in Donbas had generated neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a locally rooted, internally driven armed conflict. The role of the Kremlin's military intervention was paramount for hostilities to begin.

### **Frozen Conflict Phase**

According to a top U.S. general in January, Russian supplied drones and electronic jamming have ensured Ukrainian troops struggle to counter artillery fire by pro-Russian militants. "The rebels have Russian-provided UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) that are giving the rebels the detection capability and the ability to target Ukrainian forces". Advanced electronic jamming was also reported by OSCE observers on numerous occasions.

US Army commander in Europe Ben Hodges stated in February 2015 that "it's very obvious from the amount of ammunition, type of equipment, there's direct Russian military intervention in the Debaltseve area". According to estimates by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in February, Russian separatist forces numbered around 36,000 troops (as compared to 34,000 Ukrainian), of whom 8,500–10,000 were Russian soldiers.

Additionally, around 1,000 GRU troops were operating in the area. According to military expert Ilya Kramnik, total Ukrainian forces outnumbered the Russian forces by a factor of two (20,000 Russian separatists vs. 40,000 fighting for Ukraine). In February 2015, the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta obtained documents, allegedly written by oligarch Konstantin Malofayev and others, which provided the Russian government with a strategy in the event of Viktor Yanukovich's removal from power and the break-up of Ukraine, which were considered likely. The documents outlined plans for the annexation of Crimea and the eastern portions of the country, closely describing the events that actually followed after Yanukovich's fall. The documents also described plans for a public relations campaign which would seek to justify Russian actions.

## **Pre-War Events**

### **How Putin sees Ukraine**

Since Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, it has gradually looked to the West - both the EU and Nato. Russia's leader has sought to reverse that, seeing the fall of the Soviet Union as the "disintegration of historical Russia". He has claimed Russians and Ukrainians are one people, denying Ukraine its long history and seeing today's independent state merely as an "anti-Russia project". "Ukraine never had stable traditions of genuine statehood," he asserted. It was his pressure on Ukraine's pro-Russian leader, Viktor Yanukovich, not to sign a deal with the European Union in 2013 that led to protests that ultimately ousted the Ukrainian president in February 2014. Russia then seized Ukraine's southern region of Crimea and triggered a separatist rebellion in the east and a war that claimed 14,000 lives. As he prepared to invade in February, he tore up an unfulfilled 2015 Minsk peace deal and accused Nato of threatening "our historic future as a nation", claiming without foundation that Nato countries wanted to bring the war to Crimea. He has lately accused Nato of using Ukraine to wage a proxy war against Russia.

### **What is Putin's original goal?**


The Russian leader's initial aim was to overrun Ukraine and depose its government, ending for good its desire to join the Western defensive alliance Nato. After a month of failures, he abandoned his bid to capture the capital Kyiv and turned his ambitions to Ukraine's east and south. Launching the invasion on 24 February he told the Russian people his goal was to "demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine". His declared aim was to protect people subjected to what he called eight years of bullying and genocide by Ukraine's government. Another objective was soon added: ensuring Ukraine's neutral status. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke of freeing Ukraine from oppression while foreign intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin argued "Russia's future and its future place

in the world are at stake". Ukraine's democratically elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said "the enemy has designated me as target number one; my family is target number two". His adviser said Russian troops made two attempts to storm the presidential compound. Russia's leader refused to call it an invasion or a war. Moscow continues to coin Europe's biggest war since 1945 as a "special military operation". The claims of Nazis and genocide in Ukraine are completely unfounded but part of a narrative repeated by Russia for years. "It's crazy, sometimes not even they can explain what they are referring to," complained Ukraine's foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba. However, an opinion piece by state-run news agency Ria Novosti made clear that "denazification is inevitably also de-Ukrainisation" - in effect erasing the modern state. And it is Russia that is now accused by the international community of carrying out war crimes. Several countries including the US and Canada go further and call it genocide. After so much destruction, the Russian leader's words ring very hollowly now: "It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory; we do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force."

### What's Putin's problem with NATO?

For Russia's leader, the West's 30-member defensive military alliance has one aim - to split society in Russia and ultimately destroy it. Ahead of the war, he demanded that Nato turn the clock back to 1997 and reverse its eastward expansion, removing its forces and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance in 1997 and not deploying "strike weapons near Russia's borders". That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In President Putin's eyes, the West promised back in 1990 that Nato would expand "not an inch to the east", but did so anyway. That was before the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, so the promise made to then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev only referred to East Germany in the context of a reunified Germany. Mr Gorbachev said later that "the topic of Nato expansion was never discussed" at the time. And the context in the 1990s was very different, says Barbara Zanchetta: "It was not done as a provocation, there was a partnership for peace."

### Nato's expansion since 1997



### Ukraine's position in the world

Since the mid-1990s Ukraine has been an important strategic partner of the US outside of the Nato framework, this status having been formalised in the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic

Partnership (2008; a new one was signed in 2021). The current charter affirms the American commitment to enhancing Ukraine's security in "countering Russian aggression", but the specific measures listed in it focus on US assistance in reforming the Ukrainian army and data-sharing. No existing treaties require the US to defend Ukraine in case of war.

Several hundred US, Canadian, British, and other European military instructors are training Ukrainian army personnel, primarily in defensive and de-mining techniques at the Yavoriv training field near the Polish border – the opposite end of the country from the conflict zone. Almost certainly not, because nobody wants to give Russia a pretext for hostilities against the west. Even during the Cold War, the opposing nuclear powers were careful not to fight each other directly, but always through proxies, such as pro-communist Vietnamese.

There is also no need for western troops' involvement because Ukraine has a relatively large and battle-hardened army. The whole reason for selecting the Yavoriv Training Field as the base of the US, British, and other western instructors was its proximity to the Polish border, which is only 20km away. It is expected that the western instructors would be evacuated to Poland in case of war, although they might come back once the front line stabilised.

The aim of joining Nato is now enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution, and its armed forces are gradually transitioning to Nato standards, but in 2008, the last time that Nato members discussed the idea of Ukraine's accession, Germany and France blocked it so as not to provoke Russia. This may change with President Putin's current gamble.

## **2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine**

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, marking a steep escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014 following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity. The invasion has caused Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II with more than 5.4 million Ukrainians leaving the country and a quarter of the population displaced. At the start of the war in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed separatists seized part of the south-eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, sparking a regional war there. In 2021, Russia began a large military build-up along its border with Ukraine, amassing up to 190,000 troops along with their equipment.

In a televised address shortly before the invasion, Russian president Vladimir Putin espoused irredentist views, questioned Ukraine's right to statehood, and falsely accused Ukraine of being governed by neo-Nazis who persecute the ethnic Russian minority.

Putin also said the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) constitutes a threat to Russia's national security by expanding eastward since the early 2000s, which NATO

disputed. Russia demanded NATO cease expansion and bar Ukraine from ever joining the alliance permanently.

The United States and others accused Russia of planning to attack or invade Ukraine, which Russian officials repeatedly denied as late as 23 February 2022. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognised the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two self-proclaimed statelets in Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists.

The following day, the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force abroad, and Russian troops overtly entered both territories. The invasion began on the morning of 24 February, when Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine. Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes hit across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv, shortly followed by a large ground invasion from multiple directions.

In response, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted martial law and general mobilisation of all-male Ukrainian citizens between the ages of 18 and 60, who were banned from leaving the country. At the start of the invasion on 24 February, the northern front was launched out of Belarus and targeted Kyiv with a northeastern front launched at the city of Kharkiv; the southeastern front was conducted as two separate spearhead fronts including a southern front (originating in Crimea) and a separate probative southeastern front (launched at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas).

On 8 April, the Russian ministry had announced that all its troops and divisions deployed in southeastern Ukraine would be united under General Alexander Dvornikov, who was placed in charge of combined military operations, including the redeployed probative fronts originally assigned to the northern front and the north-eastern front which were subsequently withdrawn and reassigned to the second phase to the southeastern front.

By 17 April, progress on the southeastern front appeared to be impeded by residual troops continuing to hold out in abandoned factories in Mariupol.

On 19 April, Russia launched a renewed invasion front referred to as an "eastern assault" across a 300-mile front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk, with simultaneous missile attacks again directed at Kyiv in the north and Lviv in western Ukraine. The invasion has been widely condemned internationally as an act of aggression

The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed new sanctions, which have affected the economies of Russia and the world, and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Protests occurred around the

world; those in Russia have been met with mass arrests and increased media censorship, including banning the use of the words "war" and "invasion".

Numerous companies withdrew their products and services from Russia and Belarus, and Russian state-funded media were banned from broadcasting and removed from online platforms. The International Criminal Court opened an investigation into war crimes that occurred in Ukraine from the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity through to war crimes in the 2022 invasion.

### **Why no country supports Ukraine in action?**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) said it condemned "in the strongest possible terms" Russia's attack on Ukraine, but it has not sent any troops to Ukraine. This is because Ukraine is not a member of the Nato alliance, meaning it is not obligated to launch an armed attack against Russia to protect Ukraine.

Nato is a military alliance made up of 30 countries including the UK and the US. Allies have increased the number of troops in Nato countries surrounding Ukraine in recent weeks. Some members have also been providing indirect support, including arms, ammunition and other equipment as well as providing the country with intelligence.

When President Putin declared war, he warned countries against "interfering" with Ukraine, saying: "If you do, you will face consequences greater than any you have faced in history." Defence Secretary Ben Wallace told BBC Breakfast that British troops will not be sent to fight "directly" with the Russians. He said: "We've done the next best thing, which is train over 20,000 Ukrainians, provided them with lethal capabilities, which they are using right now. "But I'm not putting British troops directly to fight Russian troops.

That would trigger a European war because we are a Nato country, and Russia would therefore be attacking Nato." American President Joe Biden has said he will not send troops to Ukraine, saying: "Our forces are not and will not be engaged in the conflict. "Our forces are not going to Europe to fight in Ukraine but to defend our NATO allies and reassure those allies in the east."

### **Russian Oil Power**

Russia is a major player in global energy markets. It is one of the world's top three crude producers, vying for the top spot with Saudi Arabia and the United States. Russia relies heavily on revenues from oil and natural gas, which in 2021 made up 45% of Russia's federal budget. In 2021, Russian crude and condensate output reached 10.5 million barrels per day (bpd), making up 14% of the world's total supply.

Russia has oil and gas production facilities throughout the country, but the bulk of its fields are concentrated in western and eastern Siberia. In 2021 Russia exported an

estimated 4.7 million bpd of crude, to countries around the world. China is the largest importer of Russian crude (1.6 million bpd), but Russia exports a significant volume to buyers in Europe (2.4 million bpd).

Russia produces several different types of crude oil, but its main export blend is the Urals, which is a medium sour crude. It also exports large volumes of ESPO blend crude to Asia, via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. Other grades include Siberian light, Sokol, Sakhalin blend, Arctic oil and Novy Port. While the Russian oil industry has seen a period of consolidation in recent years, several major players remain.

Rosneft, which is state-owned, is the largest oil producer in Russia. It is followed by LUKOIL, which is the largest privately-owned oil company in the country. Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft and Russneft also have significant production and refining assets.

Russia has extensive crude export pipeline capacity, allowing it to ship large volumes of crude directly to Europe as well as Asia. The roughly 5,500 km Druzhba pipeline system, the world's longest pipeline network, transports 750,000 bpd of crude directly to refiners in east and central Europe.

At present, Russia supplies roughly 20% of the total European refinery crude throughputs. In 2012, Russia launched the 4,740 km 1.6 million bpd ESPO pipeline, which sends crude directly to Asian markets such as China and Japan. The pipeline was part of Russia's general energy pivot to Asia, a strategy focused on shifting export dependence away from Europe, and taking advantage of growing Asian demand for crude.

Russia also ships crude by tanker from the Northwest ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk, as well as the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, and Kozmino in the Far East. In addition, Russia also exports crude by rail.

Russia has an estimated 6.9 million bpd of refining capacity and produces a substantial amount of oil products, such as gasoline and diesel. Russian companies have spent the last decade investing heavily in primary and secondary refining capacity in order to take advantage of favourable government taxation, as well as growing global diesel demand.

As a result, Russia has been able to shift the vast majority of its motor fuel production to meet Euro 5 (10 ppm) standards. Russia's energy strategy has prioritized self-sufficiency in gasoline, so it tends to export minimal volumes. However, Russian refiners produce roughly double the diesel needed to satisfy domestic demand, and typically export half their annual production, much of it to European markets. In addition, Russia is a major exporter of vacuum gas oil and heavy fuel oil.

In 2021 Russian refineries processed 5.6 million bpd of crude and exported 2.8 million bpd of oil products. Europe remains a major market for Russian oil products. In 2021 Russia exported 750,000 bpd of diesel to Europe, meeting 10% of demand.

### **Countries Supporting Russia in War with Ukraine**

In this conflict, countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, including Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyzstan, will stand by Russia. Also extending its support to Putin was Cuba, a close ally of the Russians.

Due to its good relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, India has maintained a neutral position as a non-aligned state.

China aims to take diplomatic measures and strike a balance between western countries and Russia. On the other side, the Chinese president Xi Jinping is eager to boost the nation's ties with Russia, so it cannot endorse the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Beijing's foreign minister, Wang Yi, pleaded with all parties to be restrained.

### **Countries Supporting Ukraine**

There is full support among NATO countries – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is the cause of the most massive support for Ukraine from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Germany and France made a hurried visit to Moscow recently to defuse the controversy that has newly erupted. The United States and Canada halted approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline after President Putin recognized two breakaway regions of Ukraine as independent nations and sent Russian troops there.

### **Definitions of Keywords**

**Nato:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an international military alliance that was established on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 countries on April 4, 1949, and joined by 18 more countries at different times. Members of the organization make a common defence against the attack that may come from any external power.

**USSR:** The Soviet Union, officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was a communist state that spanned Eurasia from 1922 to 1991. It was nominally a federal union of fifteen national republics; in practice, its government and economy were highly centralized until its final years.

**Troops:** Soldiers on duty in a large duty. Example: United Nations troops have been deployed only in a peacekeeping role.

**Force:** Coercion or compulsion, especially with the use or threat of violence.

**Invasion:** An occasion when a large number of people or things come to a place in an annoying and unwanted way

**Conflict:** Competitive or opposing action of incompatibles: antagonistic state or action

**Peninsula:** A peninsula is a landform surrounded by water on most of its borders while being connected to a mainland from which it extends. (Crimea, Florida etc.)

**Nuclear:** Relating to weapons, or the use of weapons, which use the power produced when the nucleus of an atom is divided or joined to another nucleus

**Revolution:** A forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favour of a new system.

**Demand:** To ask for something forcefully, in a way that shows that you do not expect to be refused

**Annex:** To take possession of an area of land or a country and add it to a larger area, usually by force

### **Further Notes**

While writing this study guide, the general outlines of the war, the countries that played an active role and their situations, the political positions of the world and important countries, the events that took place before the war, the hot developments and important points during the war and similar events were included. The study guide has been updated until May 10th, and further events (if it happens) will be updated during the conference.

The study guide is just a guide and covers general lines, you can check the links in the bibliography section for more information and details, or you can do your own research.

### **Questions Should Be Covered In Resolution**

1-The conflict has intensified in recent days, as foreign powers and other institutions have been attempting to cease armed actions in Ukraine, however, no significant progress has been achieved, what actions will be taken to end all military actions in Ukraine?

- 2- As the conflict continues so will the devastated populace continue to require humanitarian assistance, as warfare is a costly and complicated process, how will the international community assist civilians affected by the conflict?
- 3- The international markets have been heavily affected by the warfare ensuing in Ukraine, especially energy prices, will there be any actions to solve such effects on the global markets?
- 4- There have been reports of committed war crimes on the battlefields in Ukraine, how will it be ensured that those who are guilty of such actions receive their judgement?
- 5- In the possible event of an end for all armed actions, which actions will be taken to achieve everlasting peace and an end to all disputes in the area, furthermore how will such actions be implemented?
- 6- What actions will be taken to aid and rebuild the war-torn areas and how will the international community implement such actions?
- 7- Due to the warfare in Ukraine, many Ukrainians have been displaced both internally and externally as more and more civilians are fleeing to safer areas both in Ukraine and into neighbouring countries. How may this problem be solved before the further deterioration in the area?

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